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is the paramount event for determining the guilt
he
emphasized
that "the
trial
v. Coldefendant."
(Herrera
or Supreme
innocenceCourt
of thehas
lins, 506 U.S. 390, 416 (1993).) On the other hand, the
court has noted that in our adversarial system, "the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a
perfect one." (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681
(1986).) While no trial may be completely "perfect," some
trial errors are more harmful than others. With the benefit
of modern DNA tests, we know that even at a seemingly
"fair trial," an innocent person can be convicted. Every
few weeks another innocent person is walked out of prison, freed by DNA testing on old evidence.
Looking back at the criminal trials of those innocent
people, one might expect to find out that weak evidence
was used to convict them, since, after all, they were not
actually guilty. Perhaps jurors were swayed by sinister
details of the rapes and murders with which the defendants were charged. However, when reading the transcripts of those trials, one finds that jurors were not always so wrong to convict based on the seemingly solid
evidence that they heard. Only years later did DNA tests
show that this trial evidence was in fact deeply flawed.
In retrospect, we can unravel how what the jurors saw
was misleading. Grave errors were cemented before trial,
during the criminal investigation, and crucial evidence
was contaminated or even concealed, making cases seem
far stronger than they should have been to the jurors.
Even seemingly powerful testimony by a trial witness-

sae

an informant recalling the defendant's confession, a detective describing a confession in custody, and an eyewitness pointing out the defendant from the stand-can be
tainted by unreliable procedures commonly used by police
across the country. A few representative examples from
wrongful conviction cases illustrate flaws in our criminal
procedure and how states can effectively reform criminal
procedure to make our criminal trials less error-prone.
Jailhouse Informants and ProsecUtoral
Misconduct

Jerry Watkins served 13 years for a murder he did not
commit. In November 1984, an 11-year-old girl was
found stabbed to death in a partially wooded field in
Hancock County, Indiana. The autopsy indicated that
she had been raped. She was Watkins's sister-in-law, and,
despite a strong alibi, he was a suspect early on for a
reason: He had been previously charged with molesting
her. He had pleaded guilty to molestation, and a year
later was in a holding cell, facing sentencing in nearby
Marion County, Indiana.
There, a jailhouse informant was placed in Watkins's
cell. The informant had just been convicted of forgery
and burglary, but police apparently asked that sentencing be postponed pending his cooperation. The informant had a long list of aliases, prior convictions, and
escapes from prison. He had a history of cooperating
with the police in multiple states. (Trial transcript at
1068-78, Watkins v. State, 3CSCC-87C8-CB-764 (Ind.
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Aug. 1987).) At Watkins's criminal trial, the informant
testified that he hadn't yet received any money from police in Indiana, but in Florida he was paid "by the kilo"
in cocaine he helped police seize. (Id. at 1076.) He testified so frequently that he had hangers and clothes in
his cell. He commented: "No one else has had clothes to
wear to Court." (Id. at 1102.)
He was placed in Watkins's cell and claimed he heard
Watkins confess in detail to the murder. He described at
trial how Watkins "was upset real bad, he was cryin'. He
was holdin' the bible in his hands." (Id. at 1053.) More
powerful were the details about the crime. He said the
victim was Watkins's "sister's little girl." "He said that
he'd cut her throat. That he'd left her in some bushes in
Hancock County." More specifically, he said "her jugular vein was cut."(Id at 1058.) The informant said that
he had no prior knowledge of these details: "I hadn't
heard anything about it either." (Id. at 1062.)
The informant also denied that prosecutors made him any
promises of leniency. He said: "They didn't promise to do
anything. They said that after the trial was over.., that they
would talk to the people in Indianapolis and if there was
any consideration or anything-it would be done." (Id.
at 1065.) The prosecutors denied at trial that there had
been any deal. The informant had by the time of trial
been sentenced, and a prosecutor testified that there was
no consideration "whatsoever" given to the informant's
cooperation in the Watkins case. (Id. at 1921.)
No other evidence connected Watkins to the crime. In
fact, blood typing excluded him. The prosecution theory
was that one man raped and killed the victim. The forensic analyst inaccurately suggested to the jury that the serology might be inconclusive, speculating that the blood
group substances that excluded Watkins might be "erratic" or "spurious" or the result of bacterial contamination. Watkins also presented a detailed alibi at trial, and
several alibi witnesses testified on his behalf. However,
since the time of death could not be pinned down, he
had to account for his whereabouts over several days.
Watkins also took the stand. He admitted to molesting
the victim in the past, but denied committing a murder.
He denied that he had ever confessed in jail, but recalled
that "a man he did not know had been in the holding cell
the day of his sentencing and had asked him lots of questions about his case." Watkins recalled that the informant
'just kept buggin' me and buggin' me and buggin' me trying to see what he could get out of me," and that he finally
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"got tired of him askin' me so I told him" nothing more
than "what charge I was in for." (Id. at 1737.)
The jury also had more cause to doubt the informant's
story. The defense presented another inmate at trial, who
heard the informant describe "a scheme for getting out
of jail. The plan was to find an unsolved crime, have
a confederate research the newspaper coverage," and
then tell police he heard the culprit confess. Prosecutors responded by introducing newspaper articles into
evidence, and pointing out that none of them included
details about how the victim was killed or the vegetation
where her body was found.
During the closing arguments, the prosecutor admitted that the informant had testified for the police many
times before, but insisted that in this case, "we've promised him nothing." He had argued: "Did he research it in
the paper as has been intimated? I don't think so

...it

just couldn't happen." The prosecutor noted that the informant "knew about the jugular vein-something that
was never in the paper." In addition, the informant had
said Watkins admitted that he "left this little girl in the
bushes, which was certainly an accurate statement." (Id.
at 2172.) This was information that the "public could
not know, the public did not know." (Id. at 2224.)
The defense lawyer in response agreed that the "jugular vein is a bombshell in this case," but countered that he
could have heard that information from multiple sources
or just assumed a fatal stabbing to the neck would have
severed the jugular. (Id. at 2189.) The defense added that
the informant "goes around the land peddling perjury,"
and was "a master of misinformation" who would "turn
in his own mother if he thought he could get out of jail
a day early." (Id. at 2190-91.)
Jurors were clearly focused on the testimony of the
jailhouse informant. During their deliberations, they
asked to read his testimony again. (Id. at 46.) They found
Watkins guilty, though the jury recommended against a
death sentence. Watkins was sentenced to 60 years in
prison for murder. After the trial, the defense introduced
affidavits from two more men in the jail who said the
informant had told them how police fed him the details
about the crime. The court denied the motion for a new
trial and Watkins's appeals were dismissed.
In 1992, Jerry Watkins obtained DNA testing that ex-

cluded him as the rapist. Remarkably, the Indiana Court of
Appeals concluded that the DNA results were not sufficient
to order his release, stating that they oniy "suggest the possibilty" of another perpetrator and were merely "cumulative
of the trial evidence. (Watkins v. State, 661 N.E.2d 911 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996).) In fact, the DNA conclusively showed that
someone else, not Watkins, had raped the victim.
Meanwhile, a host of evidence of prosecutorial misconduct mounted. The jury had not heard the whole

story-not even close. Evidence about other suspects
had been concealed. So had evidence about a witness
who gave a detailed and accurate description of what the
victim was wearing and saw the victim abducted from a
park in a black Camaro; Watkins had no such car. Several others gave statements that the informant admitted
to making up his statements.
Watkins filed a federal habeas petition, again seeking to
have his conviction overturned. The federal judge described
how it had been uncovered that placing the informant in
Watkins's cell had been contrary to a direct and "emphatic"
order from the jail commander that this informant was not
to be allowed outside his own cellblock. (Watkins v. Miller,
92 E Supp. 2d 824, 834 (S.D. Ind. 2000).) The informant
had also recanted in an affidavit in which he said:
That the State of Indiana did in fact pay (with
promises) for this petitioner's testimony, and did
in fact show him not only the "death-site," but
"grizzely" [sic] pictures of the murder in order to
inflame this petitioner's feelings towards the defendant (Jerry Watkins), and thus secured (for the
state) a statement from this petitioner that could,
and was used to obtain a conviction.
(Id. at 852.)

He went on to say that he was cheated and that "the
Courts [of] the (State of Indiana) and (Jerry Watkins)
were cheated as well." (Id.) If it was true that police had
shown the informant photographs of the dead victim
and had taken him to the field where she had been killed,
then they would have suborned perjury and actively participated in fabricating false testimony against Watkins.
The federal judge concluded that if this statement was
true, it was "explosive." (Id. at 853.) Records that the defense had never seen showed police had met with the informant several times at the jail just before Watkins was
in the holding cell with him-and had taken the informant out of the jail, perhaps to see the "death-site." If
the informant had, in fact, received the "detailed information" about the murder from police or a prosecutor,
"that information utterly destroys the state's case against
Watkins" and it "described an intentional corruption of
the criminal justice system." The judge noted that the
prosecution had at trial brought in newspaper articles
about the case to show that the jailhouse informant had
"specific, correct knowledge that he could not have derived from newspaper articles." (Id.)
Although the court granted Watkins's habeas petition,
the federal judge failed to ensure that the prosecutors who
allegedly fed facts to the informant were appropriately
sanctioned. The judge decided not to address whether
the police and prosecutors had concealed the fact that
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they had offered the informant a deal and had fed him
specific details of the crime. Although the judge concluded that the "prosecution's failure to disclose such
information would amount to suborning perjury and
corrupting the judicial process," he declined to investigate further. Because the prosecutors had also concealed
a host of other evidence (a Brady violation), the judge
decided to reverse on that ground alone. He said that "[a]
finding of such subornation of perjury would require
more extensive proceedings and evidence than have been
submitted here." He declined to investigate much less
recommend that the prosecutor suffer any sanction for
potentially grave ethical violations. (Id.)
Meanwhile, prosecutors sought to appeal, and pushed
for another round of more modern STR DNA tests. In
1999, Watkins had asked for STR DNA tests but prosecutors had said the evidence could not be found. In 2000,
the materials were found and were tested. The results
again excluded Watkins. Prosecutors finally dropped all
charges against him and he was released. But the DNA
did more. A DNA profile was entered into the Indiana
State Police database. It matched another man who pled
guilty to the sexual assault after prosecutors agreed to
drop murder charges; another man also pled guilty to
battery. (See Jerry Watkins, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:II
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/JerryWatkins.php.)
Watkins was far from the only person exonerated by
DNA tests who was convicted based on false informant
statements. Informant statements of several different
kinds, including cellmates, codefendants, or cooperating
witnesses, played a role in 20 percent of the first 250 DNA
exoneration cases. These incentivized witnesses were concentrated in the murder cases. Just like in Watkins's case,
almost all of the jailhouse informants claimed that exonerees admitted details about the crime that only the true
culprit could have known. Many informants admitted
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receiving rewards from prosecutors for these lies, but in
some cases it came to light years later that deals with the
prosecution had been concealed from the defense.
Jailhouse informant testimony in particular is inherently suspect. If informant testimony is to be used as evidence in criminal trials, it should be carefully regulated
to make sure that deals are not hidden, prior statements
are carefully documented, and judges instruct jurors
about the potential unreliability of informant testimony.
Judges could also assess the reliability of informants
before permitting them to testify. Prosecutors can themselves adopt guidelines requiring the careful use of informants and careful documentation of their statements
and of any consideration to be provided in exchange
for their cooperation. However, very few jurisdictions
have adopted any of those protections. (But see Carol
Williams, Gov. Brown Signs Law Weakening Testimony
of Jailhouse Snitches, L.A. Now, Aug. 1, 2011, http://
tinyurl.com/3oa85ap.)

wore me down .... I was just so tired .... It's like, 'Come

on, guys, I'm tired-what do you want me to do, just confess to it?" Sterling recalls he was never asked an openended question about what happened. Instead, he was
asked leading questions and asked to answer "yes." "'Yes'
and grunts-that's basically what the whole confession is
about." (Robert Kolker, I Did It: Why Do People Confess
to Crimes They Didn't Commit?, N.Y MAG., Oct. 3, 2010,

http://nymag.com/news/crimelaw/68715/).
There were also inconsistencies that should have been
a red flag to the detectives. For example, Sterling said the
victim fell in the brush. Yet the crime scene evidence indicated that she was dragged a long distance to the place
where her body was found. Sterling had an alibi; he was
at work much of the day in question.
Sterling's defense lawyer asked the jury: "And do you
feel in your stomach that this is reliable? That this is free
of suggestion? That this is voluntary?" Prosecutors responded: "Truthful? How does the defendant know it's a
purple jacket or purple top? A guess? [The police] never
ContamInated Confessions
released to the media.., the purple jacket."
In 1988, an elderly woman was killed in Rochester, New
Sterling tried to appeal, arguing another man had
York, while out for a walk. The crime remained unsolved. committed the crime. The judge rejected his motion.
"Only Sterling confessed to authorities," read the judge's
Frank Sterling became a suspect and was interrogated
alone, without a lawyer. Sterling waived his Miranda decision. "Only Sterling had a motive.... Only Sterling
rights; when asked whether he agreed to waive, he an- knew facts that had not been publicized." Sterling spent
swered "yeah." (Trial Transcript at 618-19, People v. Ster- nearly 19 years in prison before DNA exonerated him
ling, Ind. No. 91-0624 (N.Y Cnty Ct. Sept. 17, 1992).) The and inculpated another man. (See Kolker, supra.)
interrogation began at 7 a.m. and continued for 12 hours.
Frank Sterling was not alone. In 26 percent of the first
To try to get more out of him, an officer used a hyp- 250 DNA exonerations, innocent defendants made innotic-type "relaxation" technique where he lay down be- criminating statements, delivered outright confessions, or
side Sterling, held his hand, and they breathed deeply. pleaded guilty. In 16 percent (40 cases) of the exonerations,
(Id. at 649-52.) Sterling for the first time supposedly told innocent defendants falsely confessed. All but two of the
the officer that the victim was wearing "a purple top, 40 DNA exonerees who falsely confessed were said to have
maybe two-toned, and dark pants." (Id. at 655.) The of- confessed in detail. As in Sterling's case, 23 of those 40 false
ficer also testified at trial that at the interrogation he had confessions were recorded, but only in part, usually just a
not yet looked at the photos and did not know what the confession statement at the end of a long interrogation.
victim was wearing. (Id. at 658.) But the other officer re- What the jurors heard was seemingly irrefutable evidence
called they had already showed Sterling photos of the that those individuals had confessed when they offered police details that only the true culprit could have known. In
crime scene. (Id. at 769.)
In the last 20 minutes of the interrogation the only eight cases, the confessions were thought to be such powportion that was video-recorded Sterling appears ut- erful evidence of guilt that the defendants were convicted
terly exhausted and distraught. It is difficult to watch despite DNA tests at trial that excluded them.
Police are supposed to be carefully trained never to conthat video with the knowledge that he is innocent. In the
recorded portion of the questioning, he mentions three taminate a confession by disclosing key details to the susdetails that became crucial at trial: the location of the pect. During the interrogation "[w]hat should be sought
murder in brush by the side of a jogging trial, the vic- particularly are facts that would only be known by the guilty
tim's clothing and her purple jacket, and a BB gun found person." Thus police are trained to ask open questions, like
at the scene. (See more on the case, including the taped "What happened next?" And "the truthfulness of a conportion of the confession, at www.innocenceproject.orgl
fession should be questioned, however, when the suspect is
Content/Frank Sterling.php.) Could Sterling, who we unable to provide any corroboration beyond the statement,
now know is innocent, have guessed those details?
'I did it.'" (FRED B. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGASterling later told New York Magazine, "They just TIONS AND CONFESSIONS 367, 425 (4th ed. 2001).) How-

33

ever, detectives may themselves lose track of who said
what during complex interrogations lasting many hours
and using psychologically coercive tactics. Absent a recording of the entire interrogation, it may be impossible
to unravel what transpired.
Perhaps because of the way that detailed facts were incorporated into the confessions, judges rejected challenges to
the confessions at trial. Of those 40 exonerees who falsely
confessed, 14 were mentally retarded or borderline and three
more (at least) were mentally ill. Thirteen were juveniles. All
but four were interrogated for more than three hours. Seven
described their involvement as coming to them in a "dream"
or "vision." Seven were told they failed polygraph tests.
Several described threats or physical force. In addition, like
Sterling, all waived their Miranda rights. Despite the long
interrogations they endured and the heightened vulnerability of those who were juveniles or mentally disabled, judges
rejected motions to suppress the confessions.
Recording of interrogations should be mandatory. A
record of who said what during an interrogation can help
prevent wrongful convictions like that of Frank Sterling. Recording can also increase the reliability of confessions as evidence. More than 750 law enforcement jurisdictions across
the United States are voluntarily recording interrogations.
Studies have shown that once recording becomes standard
practice, police officers and prosecutors become strong supporters of the reform. After all, a taped record can mean fewer motions to suppress and fewer claims that suspects were
unduly deceived or abused. In addition to requiring recording of interrogations, judges should also conduct hearings
to carefully evaluate those recordings to assess the reliability
of interrogations before allowing them in court. Recording
interrogations protects the innocent, aids police and prosecutors, and provides judges and jurors with the clearest
evidence of what transpired during the interrogation process.
The New Jersey Supreme Court and
Eyewitness Misidentifications
McKinley Cromedy's case would, in its way, lead to the
most thorough reconsideration of the rules surrounding
eyewitness identifications in the United States. At his trial, Cromedy's defense lawyer argued that his client had
been misidentified by the victim of a rape, telling the jury
in the opening statement that "the evidence will show,
not that she's a liar, hut that she's mistaken. that her
identification is wrong and it's a misidentification."(Trial
Transcript at 182, State v. Cromedy, Ind. No. 1243-07-93
(N.J. Super. Ct. July 27, 1994).)
The victim, a white college student, had been raped
by a black man in her apartment. A few days later, she
had helped a police artist draw a composite sketch of
a black man with a full face and a moustache, and she
looked at thousands of photos of black men who had
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been arrested. One of those photos was of Cromedy. In
fact, the police had him in mind as a suspect because he
had been seen in the area, but she did not identify him.
Almost eight months after the rape, she saw Cromedy
crossing the street. She thought he was her attacker because of his appearance, but also because of his unusual
way of walking due to a limp "a swagger," as she put
it. (Id. at 104.) She called the police, who called her back
15 minutes later to say that they had picked up a man
matching her description. She then went to the police station and positively identified Cromedy as her attacker.
The police officer explained, "I've had a lot of experience
with identifications and I'm not going to lead somebody.
I asked her to see if she recognized this person." (Id. at
142.) Yet she was not given a lineup to test her memory.
She was asked to identify Cromedy by viewing him oneon-one from behind one-way glass-a show-up.
Cromedy's lawyer argued that the identification was
improper, saying that the show-up was "like true or false,
and to me that is about as suggestive as a procedure you
can have.... She knows somebody was picked up. What
could be more suggestive?" However, the judge ruled that
the identification was admissible, emphasizing that "she
was very certain of her identification." (Id. at 164, 168.)
Following the US Supreme Court's ruling in Manson v.
Brathwaite,an eyewitness identification that was the product of suggestive procedures, such as this one, may still
be admitted based on a set of "reliability" factors, including the apparent confidence of the eyewitness. (Manson
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).) That test has been
discredited by decades of social science research demonstrating that factors such as confidence do not correspond
with reliability at all. The memory of an eyewitness must
be handled sensitively because it is highly malleable. In
fact, the apparent confidence of an eyewitness may be just
a byproduct of suggestive police procedures.
Moreover, psychologists have long found that eyewitnesses have particular trouble identifying persons of the
opposite race. The defense lawyer asked for a special jury
instruction, asking the jury to consider "whether the crossracial nature of the identification has affected the accuracy
of the witness's original perception and/or accuracy of a
subsequent identification." The trial judge denied the request. (State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999).)
The jury saw the victim describe her ordeal on the
stand, and finally, point to Cromedy in the courtroom
and agree she was "absolutely sure" he was her attacker.
The jury convicted Cromedy and he was sentenced to
60 years in prison. On appeal, though, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed his conviction. The court ruled
in 1999 that "forty years" of empirical studies documented a risk of heightened error when white eyewitnesses
try to identify black subjects. The court noted that some
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courts, such as in California, Massachusetts, and Utah,
had permitted such instructions. The court ruled that
under the facts of Cromedy's case, it was reversible error
not to instruct the jury about "the possible significance
of the cross-racial identification factor." (Id. at 120, 132.)
The court reversed Cromedy's conviction without
knowing that he was innocent. After the ruling, however, the prosecution agreed to conduct DNA tests. The
results excluded him and he was exonerated. The victim
later commented, "I couldn't believe that I was wrong."
(Tom Avril, Eyewitness' Blind Spot, PHILA. INQUIRER
(May 22, 2006) http://tinyurl.com/83jhf4e.)
What made the response to the wrongful conviction of
McKinley Cromedy even more remarkable was that the
state of New Jersey then embarked on a project of revamping its criminal procedure rules. The New Jersey attorney
general's office issued guidelines to all law enforcement
agencies in the state requiring that detailed procedures be
followed when eyewitnesses are asked to identify a suspect.
(Office of Attorney Gen., N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety,
Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures (Apr.
18, 2001).) These guidelines were a landmark reform. New
Jersey became the first state in the country to adopt doubleblind lineups. No longer would the officer administering
the procedure know who the suspect is. Other best practices long recommended by social scientists were adopted.
All lineups would use sequential photo arrays, where photos are shown one at a time to prevent "comparison shopping." Eyewitnesses were to be instructed that the perpetrator might not appear in the lineup. The results were to be
recorded, including the witnesses' certainty at the time of
the identification procedure.
In 2006, the court expanded this rule to require that
police similarly record or document all eyewitness identifications. The court noted, "Misidentification is widely
recognized as the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country." (State v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48,
62-63 (2006).) In 2007, the court adopted a model jury instruction charging all jurors not to rely on "the confidence
level" of an eyewitness, at least not "standing alone." Jurors are cautioned: "Although nothing may appear more
convincing than a witness's categorical identification of a
perpetrator, you must critically analyze such testimony.
Such identifications, even if made in good faith, ay be
mistaken." (State v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 76 (2007).)
Finally, the court asked that a special master explore
something more fundamental: the US Supreme Court's
Manson v. Brathwaitetest for evaluating admissibility of
eyewitness identifications. The special master held hearings, with the participation of the New Jersey Office of
the Public Defender, the New Jersey attorney general,
the New Jersey Association of Criminal Defense Law-

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1

WINTER 2012

yers, and the Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School,
and recommended that the court adopt a new test for
evaluating eyewitness identification evidence and require
pretrial hearings to evaluate all eyewitness identifications. The New Jersey Supreme Court issued its ruling
in that case, State v. Henderson, in August 2011, and established a comprehensive social science framework for
regulating eyewitness identifications in the courtroom.
(State v. Henderson, 203 N.J. 208 (2011).) The decision
provides a national model for how to ensure that sound
lineups are conducted in the first instance, rigorously
evaluate the reliability of eyewitness evidence pretrial,
and carefully instruct jurors about the factors affecting
the reliability of eyewitness evidence at trial.
Most other states have not yet followed suit. For example, in Kirk Bloodsworth's case, the first death row DNA
exoneration, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had upheld the trial court's refusal to allow expert testimony on
the dangers of eyewitness misidentifications. The trial
judge excluded this testimony on the grounds that such evidence would be unnecessary and would "confuse or mislead" the jury. (Bloodsworth v. State, 512 A.2d 1056, 1062
(Md. 1985).) We now know, of course, that the jury was
in fact gravely misled when it believed the eyewitnesses in
Bloodsworth's case. Other judges have become more open
to questioning reliability of eyewitness identifications by
providing juries with cautionary instructions concerning
eyewitness error, or admitting expert testimony explaining
social science research concerning misidentifications.
Seven states-Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, North
Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin-have
passed statutes in response to these misidentifications.
(Find examples of the statutes at http://www.innocence
The
project.org/fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php.)
statutes vary-the North Carolina and Ohio statutes are
the most specific in requiring that best practices be adopted for eyewitness identifications. Other states have
recommended best practices and studied the problem
further, while still more local jurisdictions and departments have adopted voluntary guidelines. All of this
marks the beginning of a sea change. Traditionally, police had no written procedures on identifications, and,
worse, they routinely used unreliable and suggestive lineups. Because so many DNA exonerations involve eyewitness misidentifications, and because decades of social
science research support use of double-blind and welldocumented lineups, police will likely continue to adopt
improved procedures. It is crucial that they do so. Nor
should our constitutional criminal procedure permit
grossly suggestive procedures so long as the identification appears "reliable." Judges should impose conse(CONTINUED 0N PAGE 42)
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M, 558 A.2d 661 (Conn. 1989), although in recent decades
a handful of state courts have resurrected the defense. The
California Supreme Court, for example, has held that the
Delinquency Code "should apply only to those who are
over 14 and may be presumed to understand the wrongfulness of their acts and to those under the age of 14 who
clearly appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct." (In re
Gladys R., 464 P2d 127 (Cal. 1970).) (Whether the proof
need be "beyond all doubt and contradiction" is another
matter.) In most states, however, every child is subject to
prosecution, regardless of age.
Maintaining a system that is essentially "age blind"
raises, or at least should raise, several legal issues. One is
competency, generally defined as the ability to understand
the proceedings and materially assist in one's defense. How
many six-year-olds or, for that matter, 10-year-olds understand judicial proceedings and possess the ability to fully
assist counsel? Second, the principle of specific intent or
mens rea is deeply ingrained in criminal law jurisprudence.
How many children below the age of 12 (or perhaps 14)
possess the mens rea we require when the offender is older?
Another issue is diminished responsibility. We increasingly
apply the principle when adjudicating a 15-year-old as opposed to a 20-year-old, but have yet to develop diminished
responsibility standards when adjudicating an eight-yearold as opposed to a 15-year-old. (An eight-year-old, like
his or her older brethren, is usually subjected to the full
restrictive panoply of juvenile delinquency dispositions.)
And just what purpose is served? Does anyone believe that
prosecuting a seven-year-old deters other seven-year-olds
from committing similar acts, or that society needs protection against seven-year-old predators? An analysis of these
principles is beyond the scope of this short article. Suffice
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to say that the American legal system has given scant attention to the underlying purposes and principles of the penal
law as applied to the very young offender.
Establishing a minimum age for delinquency prosecution would not necessarily evade the problem of dealing
with the occasional violent or lawless acts committed by
young children. Countries that follow the norm of placing an age floor under the prosecution of children treat the
complained of incident as a child welfare matter instead
of a juvenile justice issue. An assault or theft committed
by a 10-year-old may raise child protective issues or may
prove the need for family counseling and therapy (although
minor criminal acts by the very young may be just part of
growing up). Services appropriate for that age group are
within the domain of social service systems rather than the
juvenile justice system. Referring the child for juvenile delinquency prosecution, as happens to approximately 40,000
children each year, is manifestly unfair and counterproductive, like swatting a fly with a sledge hammer.
The ABA Juvenile Justice Standards recommend a
minimum age of 10, quite an improvement over the current practice of no minimum age (1 JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
SANCTIONS, Standard 2.1, (1980).) Other experts
have advocated a floor of age 12, see Rubin, supra, which
would place the United States firmly within the international consensus. Regardless of the specific age threshold,
the time is long past to abolish the century old prosecution of toddlers who, regardless of their individual aptitudes, cannot possibly fully understand the consequences
of their acts, cannot adequately defend themselves (even
with counsel), and cannot possibly benefit from restrictive
dispositions tailored to the older adolescents. m
AND
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quences if the police fail to ensure that sound identification
procedures are used. Following the New Jersey Henderson
model, judges can evaluate identifications in pretrial hearings, consider excluding the evidence or part of it, and,
when admitting it at trial, they should provide jurors with
careful instructions on the relevant factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness memory.
Conclusio

Each of the types of evidence discussed-jailhouse informant testimony, confession testimony, and eyewitness testimony-share a common problem. The jury may
hear confident witnesses describing seemingly powerful
evidence, but they cannot tell how police and prosecu-

tors may have shaped the testimony, even inadvertently.
Errors can be introduced early on in the criminal process,
and detecting them later is incredibly difficult. Once an
informant statement is contaminated, once facts are disclosed in the interrogation room, or once a suggestion is
made to an eyewitness, the opportunity to learn the truth
may be lost. These innocent people were the lucky ones
in one way, despite the ordeals they suffered, since DNA
tests could later be done to free them. That is not true of
the vast majority of criminal convictions, which do not
involve usable DNA evidence. While these wrongful convictions are the tip of a much larger iceberg, we can learn
from patterns of error in these trials to make our criminal
justice system more accurate.,0
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